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Abstract—Radio waves are the medium used by sensors to
communicate and exchange data. The unconstrained accessi-
bility to any information carried over this medium is a security
issue in many sensor-based applications.
Ensuring protected wireless communications is a problem
that has received a lot of attention in the context of ad hoc
networks. However, due to hardware constraints of sensors
along with multi-hop communication, most of these solutions
turn out to be useless for sensor networks.
This paper provides basic building blocks to establish secure
communication by exchanging secret keys between neighbor
nodes without any use of cryptography methods allowing an
gain in efficiency. This paper also proposes a second algorithm
that extends the secret key establishment to nodes that are
not direct neighbors. Among the interesting features of the
proposed algorithms we can note a low overhead and the
absence of initial configuration.
Keywords: Distributed algorithm, Malicious behavior, Reliabil-
ity, Resiliency, Sensor network, Wireless communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are large networks
composed by tiny devices with very restricted resources
in terms of computational power, memory and above all
energy. The fact that sensors communicate using a radio
technology medium, allows any entity located within the
communication range of an emitting sensor to receive sent
messages and hence compromise the privacy of data ex-
changed. As sensors can be deployed in a large area, and
as the communication range is small, sensors have to use
multi-hop communication to reach the sink. In consequence,
the number of sensors which relay the data is high (routing
sensors). This allows malicious nodes to compromise the
integrity by modifying the data they relay or by lying about
its origin.
Several approaches have been proposed to protect commu-
nication between two neighbors based on cryptography. Due
to the limited resources of sensors, the use of asymmetric
cryptography was considered very costly [2]. Recently, the
use of elliptic curve cryptography based on exponentiation
reduced drastically this cost however it still needs a public
key infrastructure. A similar problem holds for the use
of symmetric cryptography which requires an initial con-
figuration [3], [5], [9], [12]. To be able to communicate,
any pair of neighbor sensors has to share an initial key.
A straightforward solution consists in assigning a personal
key to each node and then distributing the key of each
sensor to its neighbors. Because the network configuration
has to be known, this kind of solution is very constraining
or simply impossible if the sensors are disseminated by
an airplane or in a hostile area. Moreover, this entails
an ad hoc parametrization of all the sensors, hence the
impossibility to automate the programming of the sensors.
To avoid this constraint, solutions based on the birthday
paradox have been proposed [11]. This allows the use of
symmetric cryptography without any a priori knowledge of
the network topology but imposes an expensive initial step
after the network bootstrap in order to localize the keys and
then rearrange them. Finally, existing approaches require
a tedious configuration and / or an expensive initial step
to allow the establishment of a protected communication
between two nodes. Moreover, as a key is obtained by
configuration, it cannot be renewed as easily as it can be
revealed by capture-attacks.
In this paper, we propose a new approach to establish
protected communications in sensor networks without any
initial configuration (all the nodes can have the exact same
initial configuration except their own id) and the protection
can be renewed at any point of the execution. Our approach
allows to share a secret between two neighbors based only
on the geographically uniform distribution of the nodes.
More precisely, it relies on the observation that many pairs
of neighboring nodes have a unique subset of common
neighbors. This allows to establish one-hop protected com-
munications. We then show that it is possible to rely on
these protected neighboring communications to establish
protected multi-hop communications. If the geographical
structure of the network is imposed, it is not always possible
to protect the communication between any pair of neighbors,
we provide a probabilistic security scheme comparable to
[11]. However, a simulation study shows that, in an area
where nodes are uniformly distributed, more than 85% of
nodes are able to establish a protected communication with
their neighbors. We also show in Section V that for some
structures, the establishment of protected communications is
always possible.
The paper is composed of 6 sections. Section II presents
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the system model with its requirements in terms of system
configuration and communication. It also introduces some
notions used in the rest of the paper. Section III describes
our approach. Namely, how to obtain a secret key shared by
two nodes and how to use this secret key to protect multi-
hop communication. Section IV presents several simulation
results that illustrate the conditions required to establish
protected communication. Section V discusses the possibil-
ity to relax some assumptions, presents the impact on the
system behavior and proposes two ad hoc network structures
that make possible protected communication all over the
network. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model consists of a finite set V of sensors (the
size of which is a priori unknown). The system is patterned
after the model given in [8].
Communication model: A sensor is equipped with a
communication device based on radio technology that allows
it to send and receive messages within a certain range (we
can say, without loss of generality that communication range
is 1). Our algorithm only requires symmetric communica-
tions, but for the sake of clarity, we model radio range
by a circle. The multi-hop communication system can be
represented by an undirected graph G = (V,E) where V
is the set of sensors and E the set of edges. There is an
edge between sensor u and sensor v if u and v can directly
communicate (they are within mutual transmission range).
We say that there is one hop between sensor u and sensor
v if edge (u, v) ∈ E.
For the sake of presentation, we will only consider the
case of Unit disk graphs [4]. This means that G has an
embedding such that the Euclidean distance between two
sensors is smaller than 1 if, and only if, they are connected
by an edge. However, note that our only requirement, for
the moment, is that communications have to be symmetric.
The symmetry of communication will be relaxed in the
Discussion section.
In our model, we consider that sensors are static and have
no notion of distance and positioning (e.g. no GPS). The
only thing sensors can learn about the topology and the
structure of the network is what they obtain by exchanging
messages with their immediate neighbors (sensors that are at
1-hop distance). We assume that the communication graph
is connected.
Timing model: The system has a synchrony require-
ment. In order to learn its neighborhood, a sensor sends a
message (that will be received by its 1-hop neighbors) and
then waits for a response from each of them. As it does not
know how many neighbors there are, all it can do is to wait
for the responses to arrive. In order to be able to stop this
step and then consider that it has got a response from all its
neighbors, communication delays need to be bounded.
Adversity model: The basic fault model considered in
sensor networks is the crash failure model. It considers that
a sensor can only fail by crashing. But sensors may also fail
by deviating from their specification. The causes of such
misbehavior are twofold: either accidental or intentional.
In fact, when a sensor approaches energy shortage, or due
to a misconception or a damaged component, its behavior
can deviate from its specification [6]. This means that
such a sensor can send messages with wrong values and
alter messages it relays. Another source of arbitrary sensor
behavior may be an external adversary whose goal is either
to make the system behave wrongly, or to collect information
and send it to a wrong destination, or to prevent other sensors
from communicating by jamming communication links, etc.
For such a purpose, the adversary can either add its own
sensors that will interfere with the sensors of the network,
or hack some of the sensors of the considered network, e.g.
by capture-attacks [10]. Defining the power of the adversary
means also to have an assumption on whether ”hacked”
sensors know each other and whether they cooperate in their
nasty job. In the literature, nodes that may deviate from their
specification are called Byzantine nodes [7].
The classical Byzantine model supposes the worst sce-
nario where the adversary has unbounded power. Given
the open nature of radio communication, and the resource-
constrained nature of sensors, this model is not suited for
sensors networks:
• If malicious nodes have no energy constraints, they
can jam communication in the network [6] and prevent
communication between sensors.
• If their computation power is not bound, the use of
cryptography is useless.
• If the number of malicious nodes is high, they can dis-
connect the network by refusing to forward messages.
In summary, we have to propose an adversary which can
be managed, but powerful enough to cope with real attacks
against the network.
The interested reader can find in [1] information about
the definition of the adversary when dealing with Byzantine
behaviors. In this paper, the adversary model we consider
is the following. We assume that part of the sensors can
exhibit a Byzantine behavior (it does not matter whether
these Byzantine sensors are hacked sensors or added sen-
sors). However, we consider that Byzantine sensors do not
cooperate together, cannot jam communication, and their
computation power is bounded.
We also assume that radio medium is the only way for
sensors (Byzantine or not) to communicate. Concerning the
communication graph, we consider that the graph G reduced
to the non malicious sensors remains connected.
Problem: In this paper, we exclude the use of asymmet-
ric cryptography (costly) or an initial distribution of keys,
as in such cases the problem of protected communication
becomes trivial. We want to provide each pair of neighbor
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sensors with a secret shared key such that no other sensor is
able to decipher information ciphered with this key. The use
of secret shared keys falls out of this paper’s scope. However,
once a secret key is established between two sensors, the
ciphering can consist, for example, in a simple xor of the
message one of the two sensors wants to send with the secret
key. Of course, the unciphering will then also consist in a
xor operation between the received information and the same
key (the operation is symmetric)1.
The shared secret key problem (SSK problem for short)
can be stated informally as follows. Sensors start from a state
where the only parameter that distinguishes them is their id.
We want to establish protected links between 1-hop distance
pairs of sensors. Recall that a sent message is received by
all the sensors that are at 1-hop distance. In other words, we
want to provide each pair of sensors at 1-hop distance with
a secret shared key. Such a link is called a protected link.
More formally, each sensor that participates in the shared
secret key problem gets as a result a set of keys that satisfy
the following three properties:
• Completeness: Each node will get a secret key for each
of its 1-hop neighbors.
• Symmetry: The key obtained by a node u to communi-
cate with a neighboring node v is the same as the key
obtained by node v to communicate with node u.
• Privacy: The key obtained by two 1-hop neighbors is
known only to them.
For such a purpose, nodes will execute an algorithm the
output of which is a set of keys. Each node gets as many
keys as the number of 1-hop neighbors it has.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
A. Establishing 1-Hop Secret Keys
A node has a fixed set of neighbors. This set depends
on its physical location2. The objective of this section is to
propose an algorithm that solves the SSK problem presented
in the previous section, namely, the establishment of 1-hop
secret keys.
For the sake of simplicity, we will follow the secret
key establishment through an example. Figure 1 represents
part of a sensor network composed of a set of nodes
{A,B,C,D,E}. Dotted circles represent the range of nodes
C and D, and gray lines symbolise an edge in the commu-
nication graph. These nodes only differ by their id. We want
to allow node A and node B to get a common secret key.
The different nodes around (nodes C,D and E) should not
be able to decipher the information exchanged between A
and B.
To that end, each node first builds a set containing
it’s neighbors id (including itself). In Figure 1, the edges
1It is possible to achieve one-time-password cryptography by sending a
new key each time the previous key has been used, ensuring by this way
an unbreakable ciphering.
2We consider fixed sensors. They have no way to change their location.
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Figure 1. Example of secret establishment
between sensors depict which sensors receive the basic keys
sent by nodes C,D. We can observe that the only neighbors
nodes A and B have in common are nodes C and D. Note
that A and B are also common neighbors themselves. Node
E does not belong to this set as it is not an immediate
neighbor of node B. The idea is: each common neighbor
(C and D) provides one part of the key that will protect the
link (A,B). Since only A and B can hear both C and D,
they are the only nodes able to compute a key from the two
received keyparts.
More formally, let Vi be the set of neighbors of a node i
(including i itself). We define the common neighbors set of
two nodes i and j as CNij = Vi ∩ Vj . In order to satisfy
the Privacy property of the SSK problem, the neighborhood
of A and B has to satisfy some conditions.
• A and B have at least two common neighbors namely
A and B. As the SSK problem consists in building
protected links between 1-hop distance pairs of sensors
A is a neighbor of B and vice versa. As by definition,
each node is put in its set of neighbors, the intersection
of the neighbors of any couple of neighbor node con-
tains at least the two considered nodes plus eventually
other nodes (here, C and D in addition to A and B),
each one of the common neighbors providing then part
of the key.
• A common neighbor (excluding A and B as they need
to be aware of the secret) should not be able to all hear
other common neighbors (i.e. be 1-hop neighbor with
them), otherwise C would know D’s keypart and thus
the whole key.
We can formalize these two observations under the con-
dition:
CONDij : ∩k∈CNijVk = {i, j}
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In our example, we have
CONDAB : ∩k∈CNABVk = VA ∩ VB ∩ VC ∩ VD
= {A,B,C,D,E} ∩ {A,B,C,D}
∩{A,B,C} ∩ {A,B,D,E}
= {A,B}.
If two 1-hop distance nodes i and j satisfy the condition
CONDij , they can build a secret key. This key is a function
of the basic keys provided by nodes in CNij (i and j’s
common neighbors set).
Note that if two nodes i and j have their common
neighbors set reduced to the minimal set (that is {i, j}) then
they can always establish a secret key by simply composing
their basic keys.
Algorithm 1 presents the code executed by node i. It
allows the establishment of shared secret keys between node
i and its 1-hop neighbors. It is a three steps algorithm.
The first communication step (lines 1 and 2) allows each
node i to get its 1-hop neighbors (variable Vi). Each node i
broadcasts its id that will be received by all the nodes that are
within the communication range of node i. Then each node i
collects the messages broadcast by its neighbors. In order to
simplify the writing of the algorithm, we suppose that each
node receives its own messages and handles them in the
same way it handles the messages from its neighbors. The
second step (lines 3 and 4) allows each node i to discover
the neighbors of its neighbors. The local variable Wi(j) of
node i contains the set of the neighbors of node j as seen
by i.
Note that Wi(j) = Vj (the set of 1-hop neighbors of node
j as seen by, respectively, node i and node j). In Line 5, node
i computes the set Pi. It is the set of all 1-hop neighbors
of i with which it is possible to establish secret keys. Those
are the nodes j for which the condition CONDij holds.
In line 6, node i sends a basic key it got by invoking a
service get basic key(). This could be a random function
that returns a basic key of a given fixed size. Each node
collects and stores the basic keys it receives in a local
variable bki, with bki(k) being the basic key received by
sensor i from sensor k. At this point, node i is able to build
the secret keys it shares with its neighbors that are in Pi.
For each node j ∈ Pi, node i computes the secret key by
combining (a call to comb keys function) the basic keys
sent by all the nodes that are in the common neighborhood
to itself and j (Vi ∩ Wi(j)). The combination of the keys
could be a simple xor operation over the basic keys or any
other deterministic operation.
On the correctness of the algorithm: The three prop-
erties that characterize the SSK problem (Completeness,
Symmetry and Privacy) can be stated using the variables
of the algorithm.
• Completeness: ∀i, Pi = Vi \ {i}.
• Symmetry: ∀i, ∀j ∈ Pi, keyi(j) = keyj(i)
• Privacy: ∀i, ∀j ∈ Pi,  ∃k s.t. (Vi ∩ Vj) ⊂ Vk
It is easy to see that the presented algorithm verifies the
two last properties but does not ensure the first one. Indeed,
the first property depends on the geographical dispersion
of the sensors. The sets of neighbors are a parameter of
the problem and the condition COND does not hold for
any setting. The simulation section shows that for a uniform
dispersion of the sensors, the presented condition COND
holds for a large part of the pairs of 1-hop neighbors.
Moreover, in the discussion in Section V, we exhibit ad
hoc structures for which completeness is ensured (the key
establishment is always possible).
Byzantine behavior: If some nodes can exhibit a ma-
licious (Byzantine) behavior as defined in the adversary
model (Section II), they cannot interfere much with this key
establishment since communication is symmetric. Recall that
we assume non cooperating malicious nodes. If a malicious
node lies about its neighborhood, since communication is
symmetric, a neighborhood disagreement will appear.
In such case, a message of a node j exhibited by a node
i is a proof that j and i are neighbors (even if j lies by
omitting i). The presence, or the absence of such proof
allows to detect the lying node.
A malicious node can announce fictitious neighbors but
this will only reduce its chances to share protected links with
its neighboring nodes.
B. From One Hop to any Hop
We now have the possibility to establish protected links
between neighbors. The objective of this section is to
describe how to turn this 1-hop secret keys into a way to
securely communicate with (almost) any node in the system.
1) From 1-hop to 2-hop: use disjoint paths: The tech-
nique consists in using a disjoint paths classic key estab-
lishment technique to create 2-hops shared secrets. Let us
first give some definitions. As our network is represented by
a graph G, an edge represents a link between the two vertices
it connects. An edge is said to be protected if the two nodes
it connects share a secret key. A path in G is called 1-hop
protected path if it is composed only of protected edges. Let
us consider a path p1ij that connects node i and node j, then
Cp1ij is the set of the nodes that compose the path p1ij .
It is possible to establish a 2-hop shared key (a 2-hop
protected link) between nodes i and j if there exists two
paths that connect i and j such that:
COND2ij : ∃ two 1-hop protected paths p1ij , p′1ij s.t.
Cp1ij ∩ Cp′1ij = {i, j} ∧ |Cp1ij | ≥ 2 ∧ |Cp′1ij | = 2
If COND2ij is satisfied, node i generates two basic keys
bki and bk′i, and sends them over p1ij and p′1ij , respectively.
These new 2-hop basic keys are sent through the protected
paths using the 1-hop secret keys associated to each 1-hop
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Algorithm 1 1-hop shared secret keys establishment
(1) send(i) % the value i is broadcast but will be received only by the neighbors
(2) Let Vi be the set of received ids % Set of neighbors including i itself
(3) send(i, Vi)
(4) Let Wi(j) be the set of ids received from sensor j forall j ∈ Vi % neighbors of the neighbors
(5) Let Pi = {j ∈ Vi \ {i}| ∩k∈Vi∩Wi(j) Wi(k) = {i, j}}(6) send(get basic key())
(7) Let bki(k) be the basic key received from sensor k forall k ∈ Vi
(8) Forall j ∈ Pi, keyi(j)← comb keys({bki(k)|k ∈ Vi ∩Wi(j)})
link. Thus, only nodes i and j have access to both key parts:
each relaying node is able to capture only one of the two
parts of the key. Nodes i and j have now a 2-hop protected
link to communicate with each other.
2) From 1-hop and 2-hop keys to any-hop: Using previ-
ously stated COND2ij condition, it is possible to express
the existence of a 2-hop protected path between nodes i
and j in the following way. Let p2ij be a sequence of nodes
starting with i and ending with j. p2ij is said to be a 2-
hop protected path if any consecutive nodes u and v of
the sequence are connected by a 2-hop link, with possible
exception of the last pair of nodes that can be connected
only by a 1-hop protected path (in order to deal with path
length parity).
The idea here may be explained intuitively by the follow-
ing observation. Let us consider two nodes i and j connected
by a 2-hop protected path p2ij . Consequently i and j are also
connected by a 1-hop protected path (p1ij). Let us consider
the path K that can be defined as the complimentary path of
p2ij with respect to p1ij . This is illustrated on figure 2 where
dashed lines represent p2ij and dotted lines represent K .
More formally and without loss of generality, let us
consider p1ij =< n0, . . . , n2k+1 > (where n0 = i and
n2k+1 = j, the size of p1ij is even). Path p2ij can be
defined as p2ij =< n0, n2, n4, . . . , n2k, n2k+1 > and path
k can be defined as K =< n0, n1, n3, . . . , n2k−1, n2k+1 >.
Intuitively, we decompose the path p1ij into two 2-hop
disjoint paths that share only the first and the last nodes.
If we consider K as the set of node that compose the path
K then K = Cp1ij − Cp2ij + {i, j}. In good settings, the 2-
hop path K is a 2-hop protected path. Let COND2ij be
the condition that makes K a protected path. In this case, a
p1ij path defines two 2-hop protected paths that are disjoints.
It is important to notice that the condition the path K
has to satisfy (COND2ij) is not equivalent to COND2ij .
However, simulations show that, in practice, it is most of
time satisfied.
Now suppose i wants to send a message M to j. Let
{n1 . . . n2k} be a set of nodes verifying both COND2ij
and COND2ij . Node i divides M in two parts Ma and Mb
such that M = Ma + Mb (whatever the meaning of ’+’).
Node i sends Ma over path p2ij (upper part of Figure 2), and
Mb over path K (lower part of Figure 2): it ciphers Ma for
node n2 and Mb for node n1 and sends both parts in one
message to n1. Any node ni, (i < 2k − 1) receiving such
a message unciphers half of it (say Ma), ciphers Ma right
away for its 2-hop neighbor (ni+2) and relays it to ni+1. The
last relaying node, n2k, simply ciphers its part and relays it
to j.
Using this technique, nodes i and j may communicate
securely through the sensor network without even knowing
how far they are iff the pair (i, j) satisfies both conditions
COND2ij and COND2ij . Thus, let us define the condition
for establishing multi-hop protected paths COND+ij to be:
COND+ij = COND2ij ∧ COND2ij
Note that to allow i and j to communicate in a protected
way, it is not necessary to know neither the path p1ij nor
the paths p2ij and K . A greedy 2-hop routing will make it
provided that the condition COND+ij holds.
IV. SIMULATIONS RESULTS
The possibility to establish a protected link between two
nodes i and j is strongly dependent on node arrangement.
The question now is “how often are the required conditions
satisfied?”. To answer this question, we ran several experi-
ments on a sensor network simulator. The system is modeled
by a 500 × 500 distance units square where 500 sensors
are randomly distributed according to a uniform distribution.
Various ranges allow us to test different densities (we define
the density of the system as the average number of neighbors
a node has).
A. Local Point of View
The basic condition this system is based on is COND. So
an interesting starting point is the average number of times
a node i satisfies CONDi.
The parameter that will have an effect on the occurrence
of satisfied COND conditions is the density of system.
Clearly, the more neighbors a node has, the higher the
probability to have one or more protected links.
First, one may be interested in the number of protected
1-hop links NLs we can establish over a system S.
NLs = |{CONDij |∀i ∈ S, ∀j ∈ Vi}|
Respectively, let NL2s be the 2-hop counterpart of this
indicator (using COND2ij).
Figure 3(a) plots NLs and NL2s as functions of the
density of the system. Thus, if the system has an average
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Figure 2. Example of a decomposition of a 1-hop path
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Figure 3. Impact of density on a) the number of protected links of the system b) the connectivity of the protected graph
density of 40 nodes per communication range, a node may
expect 5 or 6 one-hop secret keys. This figure shows the
impact of density: higher densities reduce the probability
for a given pair of neighbors to share a secret key, but by
increasing the number of neighbors a node has, it finally
increases the number of neighbors a node shares a secret
key.
This figure show the slight impact of density on the
number of shared keys a node may expect. However, these
results give no hint on the protected links connectivity of the
system. In other words, is the system reduced to its protected
links still connected?
B. Global Point of View
For the communication to be secure, nodes must be able
to transmit data across the system using only protected
links (using secret keys). An interesting question arises:
“ What is the ratio of the nodes of the system that can
communicate through protected links?”. Let G(V,E) be the
system graph, as presented in the system model section,
such that (i, j) ∈ E ⇔ i and j are 1-hop neighbors. Let
G1(V,E1) and G2(V,E2) be the two graphs such that
(i, j) ∈ E1 ⇔ CONDij and (i, j) ∈ E2 ⇔ COND2ij .
Let S1 and S2 be the largest connected subset of vertices of
G1 and G2 respectively. Figure 3(b) shows the variations of
|S1|/|G| (dark curve) and |S2|/|G| (gray curve).
Both curves show a slight percolation effect which il-
lustrates the effect of the density on global connectivity.
However, it shows that this algorithm ensures a protected
communication within a large part of the network as soon
as it is dense enough.
C. Privacy Enhancement
Figure 4 presents interesting results concerning routing
using protected links. The experiment is the following: each
system node computes its protected links, and tries to send a
message to the sink (arbitrarily defined as the closest node to
the system center), using either first no protection and then
the protected links established by the protocol. Each point
of the curve is the average of 20 independent experiments.
The left Figure 4(a) plots the success ratio of the greedy
routing algorithm over nodes geographical coordinates. It is
interesting to observe that greedy routing using protection
is efficient as soon as the density is high enough.
The right Figure 4(b) compares the average number of
nodes that may listen to a message successfully exchanged
between a node and the sink. Using no protection, any node
neighboring a node on the message path can listen to it.
Using protection, nodes aware of the message are: the node
originating the message, the sink node, and eventually nodes
between the sending node and a node connected to the sink
by a multi-hop protected link. It is interesting to observe
that most of the time, the sending node and the sink are
directly connected by a multi-hop protected link and can thus
confidentially communicate (only two aware nodes). Without
protection, the number of nodes aware of an exchanged
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Figure 4. Impact of the protocol over greedy routing and confidentiality
message quickly raises with the density, illustrating the
threat for confidentiality of combining radio waves and
multi-hop communication in an unsecured network.
V. DISCUSSIONS
A. Best Case Structures
In the considered model, sensors are disseminated in a
uniform but random way. In such setting the probability
to establish protected links is high but still lower than 1.
It is possible to design structures that allow to establish
protected links between any pair of neighbor nodes. In
other words, structures whose associated communication
graph satisfies property CONDij for all the edges (i, j)
of the graph E representing the network. Obviously, we
assume that a human intervention is necessary to place each
node in a particular place. Figure 5(b) depicts two such
regular structures with three different transmission ranges.
Recall that a geographical structure alone does not define
the communication graph; we need also to consider the
transmission range. One can see that for the two proposed
structures, the associated communication graphs satisfy the
above cited property whatever is the transmission range. The
only effect of the transmission range is on the variation of
the number of neighbors that participate in the key. In all
situations, if we consider any two neighbor nodes (black
circles), the intersection of the neighbors of their neighbors
only includes the two initial nodes (their common neighbors
are presented as rectangles).
B. Regular Structures
We here provide a sufficient condition on the communica-
tion graph to ensure confidentiality among all pairs of nodes.
Let G(V,E) be a graph, and let Vi be the neighbors of a node
i ∈ V . We assume the graph symmetric: i ∈ Vj ⇔ j ∈ Vi.
Definition 1: G is locally differentiable iff
∀x ∈ V, ∀y, z ∈ V 2x , (Vx ∩ Vy) = (Vx ∩ Vz)
Intuitively, this means that from the point of view of a
node, all its neighbors have different neighborhoods. Let
Kxy =
⋂
k∈Vx∩Vy Vk. Recall that any link (x, y) ∈ E is
protected iff Kxy = {x, y}.
Theorem 1: Let G be locally differentiable. Then for any
node x ∈ V , and for any y ∈ Vx, there exists a protected
path between x and y p1xy.
Proof The proof is made by induction on k in the following
statement: let x and y be two neighboring nodes in G such
that |Kxy| = k, then there exists a path p1xy of protected links
between x and y. Let us first observe that {x, y} ∈ Kxy
since {x, y} ∈ Vx and {x, y} ∈ Vy and that x and y are
neighbors. Thus if |Kxy| = 2, then Kxy = {x, y} : x and
y have a protected path of size 1 (a protected link), which
proves the statement for k = 2.
Assume now that the statement holds for any h < k,
with k > 2. Let x, y be two neighboring nodes such that
|Kxy| = k. Since k ≥ 3 there exists a node a such that
a = x, a = y and a ∈ Kxy.
a ∈ Kxy ⇔ ∀ ∈ Vx ∩ Vy, a ∈ V
⇔ ∀ ∈ Vx ∩ Vy, l ∈ Va
⇔ Va ⊃ Vx ∩ Vy
⇒ Vx ∩ Va ⊃ Vx ∩ Vy and Vy ∩ Va ⊃ Vx ∩ Vy
⇒ ∩k∈Vx∩VaVk ⊂ ∩k∈Vx∩VyVk
and ∩k∈Vy∩Va Vk ⊂ ∩k∈Vx∩VyVk
⇒ Kxa ⊂ Kxy and Kya ⊂ Kxy
The graph G is locally differentiable and since Vx∩Va ⊃
Vx ∩ Vy and Vy ∩ Va ⊃ Vx ∩ Vy , there exists a node z
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(a) (b)
Figure 5. a) Probability for a mute malicious node to intercept a communication b) Particular structures
such that z ∈ Vx ∩ Va, z ∈ Vx ∩ Vy and symmetrically a
node z′ such that z′ ∈ Vy ∩ Va, z′ ∈ Vx ∩ Vy . Note that
z ∈ Vy ⇔ y ∈ Vz ⇒ y ∈ Kxa. Symmetrically for z′ we
have x ∈ Kya.
Thus
Kxa  Kxy and Kya  Kxy
Consequently, |Kxa| < |Kxy| = k (idem for Kya). By
induction on k, we have two protected paths p1xa and p1ay.
Let p1xy = p1xa+p1ay: p1xy is a protected path between x and
y which proves the theorem. Theorem
Corollary 1: Let G be a locally differentiable connected
graph. We have ∀x, y ∈ V 2, ∃p1xy.
Proof
Since G is connected, any two nodes x and y are
connected by a path pxy. Let < n1, . . . , nk > be this path
(using x = n1 and y = nk). As G is locally differentiable,
∀i ∈< 1..n − 1 >, there is a protected link p1i(i+1). Let
p1xy =
∑n−1
i=1 p
1
i(i+1) be the protected path. Corollary
In the same way and using similar techniques, it is possi-
ble to prove that if the graph G is locally differentiable and
2-connected (there are at least two disjoint paths connecting
any pair of nodes) then any pair of nodes can be connected
by n-hop protected paths.
C. Symmetric Communication
The model given at the beginning of the paper states that
communication needs to be symmetric. Indeed, in the perfect
case where we want to establish protected links between any
pair of nodes this may be mandatory. However, as for a real
sensor network this is not always possible, we can relax this
assumption. Let us note that a link that does not serve in
the establishment of a secret key is not expected to be bi-
directional. Moreover, if two links serve in the establishment
of a same protected link then having one of them or both
of them non bi-directional has the exact same effect: the
expected protected link will not be protected.
Let us consider a sensor network with bi-directional com-
munication links. Assume that our algorithm for establishing
protected link is able to protect a fraction δ of the total
number of communication links. If now we assume the
same network but where (1) there is a fraction τ of non
bi-directional links among all the links and (2) each non
bi-directional link participated to at least one protected link
and (3) no two non bi-directional links participate to the
establishment of a same protected link. Then instead of
having a fraction delta of protected links we will have
a proportion of protected links equal to δ(1 − τ). In the
simulations we carried out, it appeared that as several links
participate to the same protected links the real proportion
of protected links is always greater then δ(1 − τ). If the
proportion of non-bidirectional links is low (less than 10%)
the overall performance of our algorithm is maintained.
D. About Byzantine Behavior
In the previously presented model, we address a particular
adversary model which could be described as the participat-
ing Byzantine. In fact, malicious nodes have to execute the
algorithm as the other nodes. This assumption is realistic in
an application which provides some services. In this case,
if malicious nodes want to access to the services they have
to simulate good nodes. Poker game is a nice illustration of
this principle: spectators are not in the game, and thus are
not prevented from cheating (e.g. by watching all players’
hands). In other words, they cannot win anything.
However, an interesting question concerns the mute
Byzantine sensors, or eavesdroppers. In this enriched model,
Byzantine sensors can also stay mute (and thus undetected)
during the application, potentially compromising confiden-
tiality by hearing a particular set of keys.
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To evaluate the threat, we ran experiments. Then, using
the same protocol, we randomly placed Byzantine mute
nodes uniformly over the network. For each node, we then
computed whether a Byzantine node is able to intercept a
confidential multi-hop communication or not. This can be
seen as a Monte-Carlo method to evaluate the vulnerable
surface of the network. The vulnerable surface represents the
area within a Byzantine node can intercept a communication.
It is important to notice that to intercept a communication,
a Byzantine node has to intercept two consecutive 2-hop
protected paths.
Figure 5(a) plots the probability for a mute malicious node
to be located in a place where it is able to compromise some
data. We considered two cases: the black curve represents the
probability for this kind of node to intercept two consecutive
links. The gray one represents the probability to intercept
two consecutive links taken by a message sent by any node
to reach a particular node (called sink in several applications)
located in the network center. This shows for example
that a randomly located Byzantine, for a 35 nodes average
neighborhood density, has 20% chances to intercept two
consecutive routes but only 3% to intercept a message to
the sink.
VI. CONCLUSION
We present in this paper a new approach to establish pro-
tected communication in a sensor network. This algorithm
does not require any initial configuration. Based only on
exchanges between neighbors, it is very efficient in terms of
the number of messages.
From a first step that establishes 1-hop protected links,
we generalized it to provide nodes with multi-hop secret
keys with a high probability provided the system is dense
enough. The different simulations we carried out show that
a 30 nodes neighborhood density, for example, allows 85%
of nodes to have protected communication. For multihop
transmissions, our algorithm does not requires key establish-
ment exchanges, and can directly be used on top of greedy
routing. Moreover, the security guarantees are similar to
solutions based on birthday paradox. Indeed, protection is
only probabilistic as only a proportion of links are protected
however, once a link is protected it is safe. Finally, our
algorithm generates few messages, scales, and requires no
initial configuration.
VII. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work has been supported by ANR project SHAMAN
and Euro-NF Network of Excellence.
REFERENCES
[1] Cachin C., Kursawe K., and Shoup V., Random oracles in
Constantinople: practical asynchronous Byzantine agreement
using cryptography. Proc. 19th ACM Symposium on Prin-
ciples of Distributed Computing (PODC’00), ACM Press,
pp. 123-132, 2000.
[2] Carman D., Kruus P., and Matt B., Constraints ans approaches
for distributed sensor networks security. Technical report
010, NAI Labs, The Security Research Division Network
associates Inc., September 2000.
[3] Chan H., Perrig A., and Song D., Random key predistribution
schemes for sensor networks, Proc. IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (SP’03), page 197, Washington, DC,
IEEE Computer Society, 2003.
[4] Clark B., Colbourn C., and Johnson D., Unit Disk Graphs.
Discrete Mathematics, vol 86(1-3):165-177, 1990.
[5] Eschenauer L., and Gligor V., A key-mamangement scheme
for distributed sensor networks. Proc. 9th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 41-47, ACM
Press, 2002.
[6] Gilbert S., Guerraoui R., and Newport C., Of malicious
motes and suspicious sensors: on the efficiency of malicious
interference in wireless networks. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol 4305:215-229, 2006.
[7] Lamport L., Shostak R.E., and Pease M., The Byzantine
generals problem. Advances in Ultra-Dependable Distributed
Systems, IEEE Computer Society Press, 1995.
[8] O’Dell R., and Wattenhofer R., Theoretical aspects of
connectivity-based multi-hop positioning. Theoretical Com-
puter Science, vol 344(1):47-68, 2005.
[9] Szczechowiak P., Oliveira L.B., Scott M., Collier M., and
Dahab R., Nanoecc: Testing the limits of elliptic curve
cryptography in sensor networks. European Conference on
Wireless Sensor Networks (EWSN’08), 2008.
[10] Tague P., and Poovendran R., Modeling adaptive node capture
attacks in multi-hop wireless networks. Ad Hoc Networks, vol
5(6):801-814, 2007.
[11] Yi C., and Agrawal D.P., Improved pairwise key establish-
ment for wireless sensor networks. Proc. 2nd IEEE Int.
Conf. on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and
Communications (WiMob 2006), Montreal, June 19-21, 2006.
[12] Zhu S., Xu S., Setia S., and Jajodia S. Establishing pairwise
keys for secure communication in ad hoc networks: a proba-
bilistic approach. Proc. 11th IEEE International Conference
on Network Protocols (ICNP03), IEEE Computer Society,
page 326, Washington, DC, 2003.
9
